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Abstract 
 
Prediction of network attacks and machine understandable security vulnerabilities are complex 
tasks for current available Intrusion Detection System [IDS]. IDS software is important for an 
enterprise network. It logs security information occurred in the network. In addition, IDSs are 
useful in recognizing malicious hack attempts, and protecting it without the need for change to 
client‟s software. Several researches in the field of machine learning have been applied to 
make these IDSs better and smarter.  
 
In our work, we propose approach for making IDSs more analytical, using semantic 
technology. We made a useful semantic connection between IDSs and National Vulnerability 
Databases [NVDs], to make the system semantically analyzed each attack logged, so it can 
perform prediction about incoming attacks or services that might be in danger. We built our 
ontology skeleton based on standard network security. Furthermore, we added useful classes 
and relations that are specific for DMZ network services. In addition, we made an option to 
allow the user to update the ontology skeleton automatically according to the network needs.  
 
Our work is evaluated and validated using four different methods: we presented a prototype 
that works over the web. Also, we applied KDDCup99 dataset to the prototype. Furthermore, 
we modeled our system using queuing model, and simulated it using Anylogic simulator. 
Validating the system using KDDCup99 benchmark shows good results law false positive 
attacks prediction. Modeling the system in a queuing model allows us to predict the behavior 
of the system in a multi-users system for heavy network traffic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
No.            Content         Page No. 
 
Declaration .............................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ iii 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Appendices ................................................................................................................ x 
Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... xi 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Problem Statement ............................................................................................................ 3 
1.3 Research Questions .......................................................................................................... 3 
1.4 Research Motivation ......................................................................................................... 4 
1.4.1. The Need for Analytical Intrusion Detection System .................................................. 4 
1.4.2. Challenges of Analytical IDS ....................................................................................... 4 
1.4.3. Limitations of Existing Work ....................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Research Objectives ......................................................................................................... 5 
1.6 Research Methodology ..................................................................................................... 6 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis ................................................................................................ 7 
 
 
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work ....................................................................... 9 
 
2.1 Background ....................................................................................................................... 9 
2.1.1. Information Security ..................................................................................................... 9 
2.1.1.1. Basic Security Concepts .......................................................................................... 10 
   v 
 
2.1.1.2. Basic Information Security Attack Vectors ............................................................. 11 
2.1.1.3. Security Tools .......................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.1.3.1. Offensive Tools .................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.1.3.2. Defensive Tools .................................................................................................... 14 
2.1.1.4. National Vulnerability Database ............................................................................. 15 
2.1.2. Semantic Web ............................................................................................................. 17 
2.1.2.1. Ontology .................................................................................................................. 18 
2.1.2.1.1. Ontology Components .......................................................................................... 18 
2.1.2.2. SPARQL .................................................................................................................. 21 
2.1.2.3. Inference Engine [Reasoner] ................................................................................... 21 
2.1.2.4. Jena Framework ....................................................................................................... 21 
2.1.2.5. EasyRdf Library ...................................................................................................... 21 
2.1.3. Google Visualization .................................................................................................. 22 
2.1.4. Queuing Model ........................................................................................................... 22 
2.2 Related Work .................................................................................................................. 24 
2.2.1. Related Works for IDS ............................................................................................... 24 
2.2.2. Related Works for Applying Semantic Web to Information Security ....................... 25 
2.2.3. Related Work for Performance ................................................................................... 27 
2.2.4. Related work for information security........................................................................ 27 
2.2.5. Summary ..................................................................................................................... 29 
 
 
Chapter 3: Architecture ..................................................................................................... 35 
 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 35 
3.2 System Components ....................................................................................................... 36 
3.2.1. Database Preparer ....................................................................................................... 38 
3.2.2. System Updater .......................................................................................................... 38 
3.2.3. Structure Updater ........................................................................................................ 38 
3.2.4. Categorizer.................................................................................................................. 39 
3.2.5. Determiner .................................................................................................................. 39 
   vi 
 
3.2.6. Visualizer .................................................................................................................... 40 
3.3 Workflow process ........................................................................................................... 40 
3.3.1. System Initialization ................................................................................................... 40 
3.4 Algorithm ....................................................................................................................... 43 
3.4.1. Prepare the Inference Engine ...................................................................................... 45 
3.4.1.1. Building the Ontology Skeleton. ............................................................................. 45 
3.4.1.2. Update the Database Signature of NVD .................................................................. 52 
3.4.1.2.1. Detailed Algorithm ............................................................................................... 55 
3.4.1.3. Update the System Structure ................................................................................... 56 
3.4.1.4. Input Data from Network Traffic and Extract CVE‟s ............................................. 60 
3.4.1.5. Reading CVE‟s and preparing the Data .................................................................. 62 
3.4.1.5.1. Methods that Concerned About the Services ....................................................... 63 
3.4.1.5.2. Methods that Concerned About the Related Attacks ........................................... 65 
3.4.1.5.3. Methods that Connected Directly to the Visualizer ............................................. 66 
3.4.1.6. Querying and Inference Necessary Information from OKB ................................... 66 
3.4.1.6.1. Classes Related to Services .................................................................................. 67 
3.4.1.6.2. Classes Related to Attacks .................................................................................... 68 
3.4.1.7. Prepare Data to be Displayed and Visualized ......................................................... 68 
3.4.1.7.1. Pie Chart Method .................................................................................................. 69 
3.4.1.7.2. Annotation Chart Method ..................................................................................... 69 
3.4.1.7.3. Word Trees Chart Method .................................................................................... 69 
3.4.1.7.4. Column Chart Method .......................................................................................... 69 
3.4.1.7.5. Organization Chart Method .................................................................................. 70 
3.5 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 70 
 
 
Chapter 4: System Validation ........................................................................................... 71 
 
4.1 KDDCup99 Experimental Data ...................................................................................... 71 
4.1.1. Measuring the Accuracy of attack prediction ............................................................. 72 
4.1.1.1. Predictions based on two parameters ...................................................................... 72 
   vii 
 
4.1.1.2. Predictions based on three parameters .................................................................... 73 
4.1.1.3. Predictions based on four parameters ...................................................................... 73 
4.1.1.4. Comparing the results with other systems ............................................................... 74 
4.2 Queuing Model ............................................................................................................... 75 
4.3 Simulating the System using Anylogic .......................................................................... 79 
4.4 System User Interface ..................................................................................................... 82 
4.4.1. Annotation Bar Page ................................................................................................... 82 
4.4.2. Service Display Page .................................................................................................. 84 
4.4.3. Dashboard Page .......................................................................................................... 86 
4.4.4. System Updates / Upgrade page ................................................................................. 88 
4.5 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 90 
 
 
Chapter 5: Summary and Future Work .......................................................................... 91 
 
5.1 Contribution .................................................................................................................... 91 
5.1.1. Extracting Useful Information from Snort NIDS and NVD....................................... 92 
5.1.2. Automatic Ontology Updates ..................................................................................... 92 
5.2 Results ............................................................................................................................ 93 
5.2.1. Measures using KDD Benchmark .............................................................................. 93 
5.2.2. Queuing Model ........................................................................................................... 93 
5.3 Limitations and Assumptions ......................................................................................... 94 
5.4 Future Work .................................................................................................................... 94 
 
 
References............................................................................................................................ 96 
صخلم ................................................................................................................................... 714 
 
 
 
 
   viii 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table No.       Table Header         Page No. 
 
 2.1-A                    Summary of papers (1-2) ........................................................................ 29 
 2.1-B                    Summary of papers (3-5) .................................................................... 30 
 2.1-C                    Summary of papers (6-7) .................................................................... 31 
 2.1-D                    Summary of papers (8-10) .................................................................. 32 
 2.1-E                    Summary of papers (11-13) ................................................................ 33 
 4.1                        Two parameters metric for accuracy prediction ..................................... 72 
 4.2                        Three parameters metric for accuracy prediction ................................... 73 
 4.3                        Four parameters metric for accuracy prediction. .................................... 74 
 4.4                        System comparisons. .............................................................................. 74 
 4.5                        Time Required to process different sizes of requests at same time. ....... 76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ix 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure No.       Figure Header         Page No. 
 
2.1                         IC3 cyber-criminal report . .............................................................................. 10 
2.‎2                        Sample NVD data feed ..................................................................................... 17 
2.3                        Sample RDF triple in XML/RDF format. ........................................................ 20 
2.4                        Sample of Google charts[Google]. ................................................................... 22 
2.5                        Jackson closed network for multiprocessors server with caches [marl]. .......... 23 
3.1                        Placement of smart analysis engine. ................................................................. 36 
‎3.2                        System architecture. ......................................................................................... 37 
‎3.3                       Information flow chart in the proposed system. ................................................ 42 
‎3.4                        Ontology skeleton. ............................................................................................ 46 
3.5                        Adding XML entries into built ontology. ......................................................... 54 
3.6                        Mechanism in structure update. ........................................................................ 58 
3.7                        Input Data from Network Traffic and Extract CVE‟s. ..................................... 62 
4.1                        System queue model. ........................................................................................ 77 
4.2                        Simulating the system using Anylogic. ............................................................ 81 
‎4.3                        Annotation bar page.......................................................................................... 83 
4.4                        Service display page. ........................................................................................ 85 
‎ ‎4 .5                       Dashboard page. ............................................................................................... 87 
4.6                        System updates / upgrades process. .................................................................. 89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   x 
 
List of Appendices 
 
Appendex No.   Appendex Header        Page No. 
 
   1                                                   Snort………..…………….…..……...…………….101 
   2                                                         Protégé….…………….....………….…….………..102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   xi 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
AFRL 
 
 
 
 
 
Air Force Research Laboratory 
AI Artificial Intelligent 
BJA Bureau of Justices Assistance 
CPE Common Platform Enumeration 
 
 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
 
 
 
 
 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
GA Genetic Algorithm 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HIDS Host Intrusion Detection System 
IC3 Internet Crime Complaint Center 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IPS Intrusion Prevention System 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
IT Information Technology 
NIDS Network Intrusion Detection System 
NVD National Vulnerability Database 
NW3C National White Collar Crime Center 
OKB Ontology Knowledge Base 
OWL Web Ontology Language 
   xii 
 
PHP 
 
Personal Home Page 
RDF Resource Description Framework 
SCAP Security Content Automation Protocol 
URI Uniform Resource Identifier 
XML Extensible Markup Language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces the thesis. It describes the problem statement, research questions, 
motivations, goals and objectives, background, and organization of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
With increasing needs for online services in the world, and the sensitivity of information 
transferred between peoples and organizations using the internet, the need for information 
security has become one of the most important issues for every person and organization. Many 
varieties of software and hardware‟s are used for the purpose of protecting the transferred 
information, such as firewalls, logging systems, Intrusion Prevention Systems [IPS], Intrusion 
Detection Systems [IDS], anti-virus programs, and others (Panda & Patra, 2007). Each one of 
these tools differs in its functionality and methods of protecting the network. The research we 
undertook concerns IDSs.  
 
IDSs technologies are used for monitoring and logging attacks which occur in a single host or 
network. Due to the complexity of attacks occurred, such as SSH brute force attacks, web 
applications attacks, and other systems services attacks. Current IDSs suffers from the 
following issues:    
 
● Signature based IDS, cannot predict new attacks. 
 
● Signature based IDS, cannot manage and connect huge amount of data logged. 
 
● Anomaly based IDS, requires a data to be trained to predict attacks. 
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● Anomaly based IDS, produces large false positive rate in detection. 
 
For this, the need for analytical IDS is required. Which should combine the advantages of 
both signature and anomaly based IDSs, and minimize the disadvantages of both. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Currently, security systems such as intrusion detection systems manage engines [for log 
management] do not provide rich analytics on security threats and vulnerabilities for system 
administrators (Kotikela, Kavi , Gomathisankaran, & Singhal, 2013) (D. Kshirsagar & Kumar, 
2013). For enterprise environments, such as ISPs, schools, and universities the Demilitarized 
Zone [DMZ] contains several critical servers that are always targeted. The current tools, for 
instance, do not predict attacks that may be launched against DMZ and cause the servers to be 
compromised. Therefore, there is a high need for more security analytics and monitoring 
software. In other words, the security analytics system should do the following: 
 
● Predict related attacks that may hit the IT systems. 
 
● Predict systems in the DMZ that may be compromised. 
 
● Show the level of risk each attack may cause. 
 
Numbers of attacks that may be launched to compromise a system are huge, due to the 
increasing number of automated hacking tools: such as METASPLOIT, CANVAS, CORE 
IMPACT, and others (nmap CO., 2016). These hacking tools depend on the services opened to 
lunch their remote attacks. In addition, each tool contains a huge database that automates 
different types of attacks against single system service (Bairwa, Mewara, & Gajrani, 2014). A 
normal IDS [signature based or anomaly based] that exists in the network cant neither predict 
what attacks may be automated to a single service, nor draw a relation between existing 
   3 
 
systems in the network, to perform a prediction on other systems or services that may be  in 
danger. In other words, these IDSs only log the attacks that occurred [signature based], or 
from the behavior of the network traffic, to predict if a packet is an attack or not [anomaly 
based]. So there are no smart IDS that are able to log security information from network 
traffic, and do a prediction on the logged traffic. From there the idea of semantic analysis 
features for IDS is created. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The following questions should be answered by our proposed system: 
 
● What are the attacks that may hit the network systems and make them vulnerable? 
 
● What are the classifications of attacks that targeted network systems? 
 
● What are the network systems that may be targeted in the future? 
 
● How the system will display statistics and security information to the administrator? 
 
● How the system will adapt to continuous changes in the network infrastructure? 
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1.4 Research Motivation 
 
1.4.1. The Need for Analytical Intrusion Detection System 
 
Analyzing log files is very important to detect and correct errors in systems, especially 
security errors. Many software systems, firewalls and Intrusion Prevention Systems [IPS] or 
Intrusion Detection Systems [IDS], show only information about current attacks, attacks on a 
specific date or signature or predict behavior of an attack. According to our knowledge, there 
is no software that does semantic analytics and prediction on security threats and 
vulnerabilities. So resolving these obstacles in smart IDS should produce the following 
benefits:  
 
 Adding analytical features to the IDS. 
 
● Reducing the possibility of false alarms, since the predictions are based on attributes. 
 
● Providing a better understanding of the data stored. 
 
● Providing a dynamic system that can be adapted according to the needs of the user 
environment, by allowing the user to add new system service dynamically. So the 
attacks prediction becomes more accurate.  
 
1.4.2. Challenges of Analytical IDS 
 
Our proposed IDS consists of two parts: the logger system, and the analyzer system. These 
parts should be able to communicate with each other‟s. The analytical part of the system 
consists of multiple parts. Each part has its own functionality, and complements the others. 
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Due to the nature of data that will be entered and presented, different programming languages 
will be used, so that the connection between these components should be smooth. 
Furthermore, the continuous changes in the needs of network services should be reflected 
easily in the system, and the display of results must be easily understandable. 
 
1.4.3. Limitations of Existing Work 
 
Two types of IDSs exists: anomaly based IDS, and signature based IDS. Signature based IDS, 
only reads the payload of a packet, and then checks it in its database, to determine if this 
payload contains a signature of an attack or not.  Anomaly based IDS examines the behaviors 
of packets in network traffic, based on trained data before, to determine if the examined 
packets payloads are normal, or containing security threats. This may produce a lot of false 
alarms. For these reasons, smart IDS should resolve the issues of these IDSs. The new IDS 
should take advantages of both types, by using a signature to log attacks, and perform 
predictions on new attacks from the logged attacks without the need for data training. 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
 
The overall goal of this thesis is to improve the IDS, and develop a new objective function to 
propose a new analytical approach for IDS. We refer to our new approach as „Smart Intrusion 
Detection System for DMZ‟, and it aims to introduce a new IDS with analytical features, good 
minimized false rate attacks predictions, and a more easily adaptable IDS according to the 
network needs. To achieve this overall goal, the following research objectives have been 
established: 
 
● Extract useful and needed security information from network traffic.  
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●  Create ontology for vulnerabilities identification. 
 
● Automate the creation of ontology structure [schema], to reflect the changes according 
to the needs of the user. 
 
● Automate the creation of Ontology Knowledge Base [OKB], from vulnerabilities 
databases. 
 
● Map the extracted security information from network traffic to the created OKB, so 
that additional security information can be extracted. 
 
● Use a visualization technique, to display the results in an easily readable view. 
 
● Validate the system using known benchmarks. 
 
● Predict the behaviors of the system in a multi-user heavy network environment, using a 
queuing model. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
This section describes the research methodology that was followed. 
 
● Plan constructing our system using modular forms. This ensures that it can be easily 
updated, and the changes can be smoothly performed. 
 
● Create an ontology skeleton that reflects vulnerabilities and network services, taking 
into account that the ontology should be changed, according to the demand of the 
network services. 
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● Develop OKB that we will use in analysis by extracting National Vulnerability 
Databases [NVD] into the created ontology. We should take into accounts that NVD 
databases continuously change.  
 
● Conduct a method to extract security information from network traffic. After that, 
convert the extracted security information, into information that can be understandable 
by the created OKB. 
 
● Develop communication protocols between the sniffed security information from snort 
IDS and the created OKB.  
 
● Analyze the information sent from the network, by performing extra processing on it in 
the, by the created OKB. The analysis should be performed by semantic web tools, so 
that it will reason and query information related to information extracted from network 
traffic. 
 
● Develop a way that presents the results in a nice Graphical User Interface [GUI]. So 
the results with huge rich information should be easily understandable. 
 
● Conduct experiments, by applying the proposed system in a known benchmark, to 
ensure the effectiveness of it.  
 
● Model the system in queuing model, to predict the behaviors of the system in a multi-
user heavy network environment. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. It presents the basic concepts of information 
security, IDSs, performance and semantic web technology that should be understandable. The 
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next chapter is literature review, which reviews traditional related works in information 
security, IDSs, performance, datamining, and focuses on ways to create smart security tools 
using semantic web technology. Chapter 3 introduces system architecture.  This chapter 
proposes a new novel approach, which improves the analytical feature in IDS, and develops 
new functionality to the IDS, based on semantic technology. The validation and results will be 
discussed in chapter 4. It examines our approach, and conducting three approaches to measure 
it. The first approach is by testing the system on KDDCup99 dataset and comparing its results 
with other systems. A queuing model is the second approach. Anylogic is the final way, to 
simulate and validate the queuing model. Finally, the results are discussed. Chapter 5 is the 
conclusion, which discusses the conclusions of the thesis, limitations and assumptions, and 
also suggests some possible future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 Background and Related Work 
 
2.1 Background 
 
This section aims to provide a general discussion of the concepts needed to understand the rest 
of the thesis. It covers basic concepts of information security, IDSs, ontology, Google 
visualization, and queuing models. 
 
2.1.1. Information Security 
 
In our days, organizations depend greatly on networks, a huge amount of information is 
exchanged though networks. Daily tasks performed rely on computers and networks, such as 
email, portal services, RSS, and others. However, losing or revealing this information may 
cause a terrible loss for an organization. Consequently, there is a sense of urgency to secure 
electronic information. 
 
Information security refers to protecting any kind of sensitive information systems from being 
revealed by unauthorized access (Cornell University) (Wikipedia, 2016). For most people and 
organizations, electronic information is a critical resource to be protected. On the other hand, 
if sensitive information is revealed to the public or the wrong person, then an organization 
may face a great threat, and the whole business may be in danger. For instance, if sensitive 
database system for an organization is hacked, and such information falls in wrong hands, it 
can create chaos in the normal functioning of an organization. 
 
Figure (2.1) is the cyber-criminal report data from IC3; the Internet Crime Complaint Center 
[IC3] is a partnership among the federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], the National White 
Collar Crime Center [NW3C], and Bureau of Justices Assistance [BJA]. According to IC3, 
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online internet crime complaints are increasing daily. From the figure, we can observe that in 
year 2010, there were 303,809 cyber-crime complaints, whereas in year 2011, complaints 
increased to 314,246. When compared to 2011, Internet crime complaints in year 2013 
decreased to some extent. But in subsequent year the internet crime compliant increased (IC3, 
2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: IC3 cyber-criminal report (IC3, 2014). 
2.1.1.1. Basic Security Concepts 
 
This section summarizes basic security concepts necessary to understand our research. 
 
● Vulnerability: a weakness in design or an implementation error that can lead to 
compromising the security of the system. In other words, vulnerability is a loop hole, 
or a weakness that becomes a source for an attacker to enter into the system, bypassing 
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various user authentications (Wang & Guo, OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability 
Management, 2009). 
 
● Exploit: a defined way to break the security of a system through vulnerability. An 
exploit can be performed locally or remotely through a network. 
 
● Information security relies on three basics elements (Parker, 1995), which are: 
 
 Confidentiality and Authenticity: to ensure that the information is accessible 
to a person who is authorized to access these data, by using certain 
authentication methods (Parker, 1995). 
 
 Integrity: the trust of data or resources in terms of preventing unauthorized 
changes (Parker, 1995). 
 
 Availability: to ensure that a system is available and online whenever a service 
request is performed. 
 
2.1.1.2. Basic Information Security Attack Vectors 
 
The following are possible attack vectors which attackers can exploit an information system: 
 
● Unpatched software: where the system or software left not updated for a long time, 
for which a lot of vulnerabilities exploits had been published against it (Ec-Council, 
2010).  
 
● Local attacker: where the attacker has a good knowledge of the systems exists in an 
organization. For example, a descrambled employee that has access to the financial 
system with authorized username and password (C. C. Palmer; IBM Research Divisio, 
2001). 
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● Network applications or services: where the attacks lunched from outside of an 
organization targeting a system online services. Such as, company website (C. C. 
Palmer; IBM Research Divisio, 2001). 
 
● Botnets: where group of attackers lunched several attacks from different locations 
targeting a system service, to hack the system or to bring it down (Ec-Council, 2010). 
 
● Insufficient security policies: where the systems administration privilege is 
distributed among different users (Ec-Council, 2010). 
 
● Social networking: where there are not educated employees from security 
perspectives can be easily fooled by attackers. For instance, email sent to an employee 
to fill his username and password for organization portal in a form sent by that email 
(C. C. Palmer; IBM Research Divisio, 2001). 
 
2.1.1.3. Security Tools 
 
Two types of tools are used in information security, offensive and defensive tools. 
 
 
2.1.1.3.1. Offensive Tools 
 
Offensive tools are the kinds of tools used by hacker[s] or security tester[s] to discover, and 
exploits the vulnerabilities of information systems. Each professional attacker follows five 
steps to perform a successful exploitation into information system. These steps are: 
 
● Information gathering [reconnaissance]: in which an attacker retrieves general 
information about the targeted organization (Phong & Yan, 2014). 
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● Scanning and vulnerability analysis: in this phase the attacker actively tests the 
systems available for an organization, to determine the type of services that are 
available online and type of vulnerabilities that might exploit these services (Phong & 
Yan, 2014) (Bairwa, Mewara, & Gajrani, 2014). 
 
● Exploiting: the attacker will run various exploits on systems services, based on 
previous steps performed (Phong & Yan, 2014). 
 
● Root access: after successfully exploiting the required IT system, the attacker tries to 
get administrator privilege on that hacked system, in order to attain full control over it 
(Ec-Council, 2010). 
 
● Log erase: the final steps performed by a professional attacker are to hide his or her 
footprint on the hacked systems by installing malicious software‟s on it, such as a 
rootkit (Ec-Council, 2010). 
 
Offensive Hacking tools can be classified into three main categories: 
 
● Information gathering tools: tools that are used to get information about IT systems, 
such as the location, registrar, and subdomains. An example of these tools is WHOIS 
(Ec-Council, 2010) (Phong & Yan, 2014). 
 
● Scanning tools: tools are used to get information about online IT systems. They return 
information about the system type, services opened, version of opened services, and 
other useful information. NMAP is a good example of scanning tools (Bairwa, 
Mewara, & Gajrani, 2014) (Phong & Yan, 2014). 
● Exploiting tools: tools are used to penetrate the information system and gain 
unauthorized access to it. They automate the attacks into a system based on services 
provided. Examples of these tools are CANVAS, METASPLOIT and CORE-IMPACT 
(Ec-Council, 2010) (Phong & Yan, 2014). 
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2.1.1.3.2. Defensive Tools 
 
The information system, especially the enterprise network and DMZ, containing the heart of 
electronic information, should be protected. As the security increased the robust our system is. 
On the other hand, we should take into account the usability of the system. Several varieties of 
systems hardware or software can used to protect information systems in their own way. The 
following subsections summarize some of the important security tools that an organization can 
use. 
 
Firewall: This tool should be the first layer of defense in any network. It may be hardware or 
software. Furthermore, it might be commercial or open source. Today, these tools are smart 
they inspect packet in all network layers, in other word they are state full inspection. Examples 
of hardware commercial firewalls are: FOTINET and SONICALL. IPABLE is an example of 
a software open source firewall. 
 
Intrusion Prevention System [IPS]: Security tool that inspects network traffic, to detect 
malicious behavior in it, then block it and report it (Wikipedia, 2016). 
 
Antivirus: Software that is installed on a machine, to detect and protect it from malware, that 
attempts to steal or destroy the information on that system. 
 
Intrusion Detection System [IDS]: Security tool that might be software or hardware, which 
is used to inspect network traffic. An IDS examines the packets inside network traffic, to 
check if it contains any malware packets, then reports the results (Panda & Patra, 2007). Two 
types of IDSs are available: 
 
● Host based IDS (HIDS): software that evaluates information which exists on single 
host or multiple hosts (D. Kshirsagar & Kumar, 2013). 
 
● Network IDS (NIDS): software or hardware. NIDS evaluates and analyzes 
information captured from network traffic. On other words, it monitors the network 
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activity for a malicious behavior, logs it, and reports it to the administrator (D. 
Kshirsagar & Kumar, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, IDSs can be classified into: 
 
● Signature based IDS: An IDS that is used to detect known attacks. It stores the 
attacks signature on an IDS database. This type of IDS requires no knowledge of 
network traffic: the IDS will only check the payloads in packets, then compare it in its 
database, to determine if these packets are attacks or not. If they are malicious, then the 
result will be logged and reported (Uddin, Khowaja, & Abdul Rehman, 2010). 
 
● Anomaly based IDS: An IDS where the signature of an attack is not known before. 
These types of IDSs are usually used to detect new types of attacks, based on previous 
data behavior (Uddin, Khowaja, & Abdul Rehman, 2010). In other words, it requires 
data to be trained, so that it can detect new attacks. A lot of research is performed on 
these types of IDSs, specifically to discover zero day attacks. In general these IDSs are 
created using smart algorithms, such as Genetic Algorithm [GA], and datamining 
methods, such as naive bays. 
 
Snort is an example of a signature based NIDS. It is considered the top open source intrusion 
detection in the world. 
2.1.1.4. National Vulnerability Database 
 
“NVD is the U.S. government repository of standards based vulnerability management data 
represented using the Security Content Automation Protocol [SCAP]” (Quinn, Waltermire, 
Johnson, Scarfone, & Banghart, 2009). NVD contains rich data about vulnerabilities, and 
useful attack information. The following is a summary of the important content of NVD: 
 
● Vulnerability information: contains normal information about the vulnerability, such 
as the date and name of the vulnerability. 
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● Product: contains a list of all products that are affected by a given vulnerability. The 
product name is in CPE format. 
 
● Vulnerability score: contains a numeric number, stating how dangerous the 
vulnerability is. 
 
● Summary: contains useful information about how an attacker can exploit a given 
vulnerability. In addition, it contains information of damage that can occur, if a 
successful attack occurs. 
 
Figure (2.2) shows a sample of NVD data feeds. 
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Figure 2.2: Sample NVD data feed 
 
2.1.2. Semantic Web 
 
This section focuses on the semantic web technology, as well as the technologies that are used 
in our research; such as Jena Java framework and easyRDF PHP library. 
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2.1.2.1. Ontology 
 
“Ontology is a formal explicit specification of a shared conceptualization” (Semantic Web, 
2012). In a modern smart system, knowledge should be discovered and the ontology 
technology should perform this task (Wang & Guo, OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability 
Management, 2009). Ontologies solve the problem of sematic interpretation between different 
web services in a different organization through semantic web technologies. Recently, 
ontologies have become a popular field of research in Artificial Intelligence [AI], and 
knowledge discovery systems, such as modern social networks (Taye , 2010). Sematic web is 
one of the applications that are built on the top ontology technology, to make the web machine 
understandable, not just machine readable. 
 
2.1.2.1.1. Ontology Components 
 
Ontology should be represented using the following four main components: 
 
● Concept (Class): an abstract set of objects. 
 
● Instance (Individual): the “ground-level component of an ontology which represents a 
specific object or element of a concept or class” (Taye , 2010). 
 
● Relation (Slot): used to connect two classes for a given domain. 
 
● Axiom: used to give a constraint on a value of a concept or individual. 
 
Usually ontology is stored in a triple format file. This file may be in turtle format: which is the 
most readable format, or in XML/RDF, or Notation 3, or RDF/JSON, or N-Triples, or JSONS 
formats. Any triple inside a file [in any format], is made up of three parts: subject, predicate 
and object, which form a statement. A subject of a statement is an entity that the statement 
describes. A predicate describes a relationship between a subject and an object. The object is 
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the value that the subject takes for that particular predicate. These statements inside a file form 
a directed graph, with subjects and objects of each statement as nodes and predicates as edges 
(Semantic Web, 2012). 
The RDF or OWL files are the most common extensions of semantic web files. Each file 
consists of two parts. Firstly, there is the schema [T-Box] part, which represents the concepts 
and relations. In other words, it represents the structure of ontology. The other part of ontology 
is the data [A-Box] part, which represents the instances. Figure (2.3) shows an example of 
RDF graph in XML/RDF format. 
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Figure 2.3: Sample RDF triple in XML/RDF format. 
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2.1.2.2. SPARQL 
 
A tool that is used to query data stored in RDF or OWL file, to get required information about 
the stored triple. 
 
2.1.2.3. Inference Engine [Reasoner] 
 
An inference engine is used to extract additional factual from instance information. It 
automates the analysis of data contents. Also, it may be used to ensure our data graph is 
consistent (W3C org, 2015). Examples of reasoners are Hermit and Pellet. 
 
2.1.2.4. Jena Framework 
 
An open source java framework dedicated to dealing with semantic web technologies. It has 
APIs that are able to create, change, and query RDF triples stored in any format. In addition, 
Jena has a strong built-in inference engine, and further-more supports known reasoners, such 
as Pellet (Apache Jena, 2015). 
 
2.1.2.5. EasyRdf Library 
 
A PHP open source library, which can read and add RDF triples over HTTP. It has vast APIs 
that allow the reading of stored RDFs easier over the web. On the contrary, it has limitations 
on performing SPARQL queries, and using of reasoners. 
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2.1.3. Google Visualization 
 
A free cross platform tool that is used to visualizes data over the web. It can be used by 
including the visualization APIs inside a JavaScript script. It has many charts types; such as: 
pie, annotation bar, histogram, organizational charts and many more. These charts are 
interactive, and can be customized easily. Figure (2.4) shows some examples of charts of this 
rich tool (Google org, 2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Sample of Google charts (Google org, 2015). 
  
2.1.4. Queuing Model 
 
"Is the mathematical study of waiting lines or queues”. We use queuing models to predict 
waiting times, and queue length before getting a service (Wikipedia, 2016). In each queue 
model design in any field, the following information should be known: arrival time, queue 
size, queue type, number of servers and service time. Queuing model can be categorized into: 
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single queue and multiple queues. Single queue is used if we have only one place for getting a 
service, such as modeling a doctor clinic. We use multiple queues if there are multiple services 
in a place, for example if we want to model multiprocessors with caches server. A Jackson 
network is an example of a multiple queue models; it is the best way to model this scenario. 
Figure (2.5) shows an example of Jackson closed network (Belch, Greiner, de Meer, & 
Trivedi, Chapter 13. Applications, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Jackson closed network for multiprocessors server with caches (Belch, Greiner, de 
Meer, & Trivedi, Chapter 13. Applications, 1998). 
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2.2 Related Work 
 
Several researches have been published in the area of information security, ontology, 
datamining, semantic technology, Intrusion Detection Systems [IDSs] and applying these 
technologies to information security. This chapter reviews related works for IDSs, semantic 
web technology for security, security software‟s algorithms, and performance measuring. The 
following subsections summarize these related works. 
 
2.2.1. Related Works for IDS 
 
There are many varieties of IDS software and they are widely used. Some of them are open 
source and others are commercial. In addition there are two common types of IDSs: that might 
use genetic algorithm, or data mining, or database signature to discover attacks. In our 
research we used snort IDS to detect and log attacks from network traffic .The following 
papers summarized these types of IDSs. 
 
Panda et al (Panda & Patra, 2007), proposed anomaly based intrusion detection system [IDS]. 
The authors showed how to implement Naïve Biase classifier, to detect new attacks. However, 
the proposed IDS is restricted to a network that has only two levels and assumes complete 
independency between the information nodes. Also for this research, data was required to be 
trained, to detect new attacks. This study produced an anomaly based IDS that has a goal to 
enhance detection rate of newly unknown attacks. In our research, we used signature-based 
detection to detect and log attacks, and for the analysis engine no data training was required, to 
perform attacks predictions. 
 
Hoque et al (Hoque, Mukit, & Bikas, 2012), created an intrusion detection system that is based 
on Genetic Algorithms (GA). The implementation of this IDS was performed in two steps. 
The first step is: the precalculation phase, where data will be trained. The second step is 
detection phase. Controversially, using GA showed a lot of false positive alarm in the results. 
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In our research the rate of false alarms and accuracy of attacks predictions were minimal. In 
addition, there was no need for the data training. 
 
2.2.2. Related Works for Applying Semantic Web to Information Security 
 
Semantic web in our research represent the heart of it, from it we can predict and extract 
additional useful information about vulnerabilities attacks. We created Ontology Knowledge 
Base [OKB] from National Vulnerability Database [NVD], which we used in our analysis 
system. Many of the following studies showed us how useful it is to use ontology in the field 
of information security. Some of this research represents a way to create ontology for NVD. 
But none of them are specialized for DMZ networks. Also, none of the following research 
contains automatic ontology updates. The following research represents the importance and 
usefulness of semantic web in information security: 
 
In Gomathisankaran et al (Kotikela, Kavi , Gomathisankaran, & Singhal, 2013), the authors 
worked on providing a smart vulnerability assessment framework for cloud computing. In this 
study, NVD was converted to knowledge base that are dedicated for cloud computing; also a 
web search was made on top of these vulnerabilities to get more information about the 
vulnerability; Such as countermeasure for each vulnerability. However, the limitation of this 
framework that it was neither validated nor did compared its results with other known 
vulnerability assessment tools. The research presented a vulnerability assessment framework 
that uses ontology for cloud computing. In our research, we also used ontology to group and 
classify vulnerabilities for the systems services in the DMZ.  
 
Khairkar A.D (D. Kshirsagar & Kumar, 2013) provided an intrusion detection system for 
detecting web attacks. In this IDS, ontology was used to group and classify web attacks. 
Furthermore, they used the ontology to identify new web attacks. On the other hand, the 
limitation of the proposed system was that it‟s unable to detect complex web attacks, 
especially for complex e-business systems. In this research ontology was used to classify web 
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attacks only. However, in our research ontology was used to classify and group attacks for 
different systems and services including known web attacks.  
 
Wang et al (Wang & Guo, OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability Management, 2009) , 
focused their research on providing semantic meaning to vulnerability database, and applying 
network security standard; such as CWE, CPE, CAPE, and CVE to build vulnerability 
ontology. On the other hand, generating data from vulnerability database was done manually 
using protégé tool, instead of extracting the data automatically. This is considered as a 
limitation. In our research, classes and relations for describing vulnerabilities were produced 
automatically, and the structure of the ontology can be changed automatically. 
 
Wang et al (Wang, Guo, Wang, Xia, & Zhou, 2009) proposed an ontology based approach, to 
analyze and assets the situation of products from security perspective. The authors 
implemented a mathematical formula to compute each vulnerability score, based on how it is 
danger and its affection on the system or service. 
 
In Saad et al (Saad & Traore, 2010), the authors provided a prototype for smart network 
forensic tools. In this paper, two types of relations were used in building the network forensic 
ontology: the taxonomic relation, and the ontological relation. In addition, three types of 
knowledge specified to be presented: problem solving goals, problem solving knowledge, and 
Factual knowledge. However, this prototype had one limitation in term of ontology creation; 
where there was huge ontology construction was performed manually, to reflect every possible 
scenario. On the contrary, in our research, ontology updates were performed automatically. 
 
Salini et al (Salini & Shenbagam, 2015) constructed ontology to predict and classify web 
attacks. Also their ontology system suggests countermeasure for the predicted attacks. On the 
other hand, their ontology is created manually, and the system used only to detect web attacks. 
Conversely, in our system ontology creation is automated, and our system includes most 
common network services, including common web attacks. 
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In Elahi et al ( Elahi, Yu, & Zannone, 2009), they proposed ontology to identify 
vulnerabilities, also they showed the impact of these vulnerabilities on systems and services on 
their ontology model. However, the ontology creation was made manually, and the results of 
attack prediction contain a lot of false alarm. On the contrary, ontology on our system is 
updated automatically, and the rate of false alarm attacks prediction is minimal. 
 
2.2.3. Related Work for Performance 
 
The following papers show different ways to improve the performance of IDSs. Some of these 
techniques may be partially implemented in our system, and other advanced techniques can be 
considered in the future work. 
 
Uddin et al (Uddin, Khowaja, & Abdul Rehman, 2010), improved the performance of IDS by 
splitting the IDS into multiple IDSs. Each IDS is responsible for detecting and analyzing only 
specific attacks signatures. In this study multiple IDSs devices were required for detecting and 
analyzing attacks. This research has a limitation, in that it required a separate device for each 
class of attacks. As the number of attacks classification increases, this research will be 
impractical in the future.  
 
Bulajoul et al (Bulajoul , James, & Pannu, 2013) , the main goal of this research was to show 
that at some points NIDS will not be able to analyze and log network traffic, especially for 
heavy network traffic with huge number of packets send through it. At the end of this research 
the authors recommend using parallel IDSs, to enhance the number of packets captured and 
analyzed. 
 
2.2.4. Related work for information security 
  
Bairwa et al (Bairwa, Mewara, & Gajrani, 2014), the authors showed the power of known 
vulnerability scanning tools, such as NEKTO and NESSUS tools. NEKTO tool is considered 
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one of the best web vulnerability scanning tools, whereas, NESSUS tool, is one of the best 
known network vulnerability scanning tools (nmap CO., 2016). In their research they showed 
how to use these tools in an effective way, to get the desired results.    
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2.2.5. Summary  
 
Table (2.1-A), table (2.1-B), table (2.1-C), table (2.1-D), and table (2.1-E) summarize these papers and show a short description of 
each one of these researches. 
 
Table 2.1-A: Summary of papers (1-2).  
 
 
 
 
 
# Reference 
id 
Setting Description of study 
design methodology 
Type of  
research 
Limitations Intervention Results Comments 
1. Panda et 
al,2007 
IDS  Apply naïve biase 
classifier to detect 
anomaly based 
intrusion. 
Empirical Restricted to a network that 
has only two levels and 
assumes complete 
independency between the 
information nodes. 
Requires data to be trained. 
Naïve classifier is 
used in attack 
detection. 
Anomaly based 
intrusion detection 
system. 
 
2. Hoque et 
al, 2012 
IDS  Implements GA to 
IDS. 
 In the 
implementation 
two phases 
performed by the 
IDS: the 
precalculation 
phase and 
detection phase. 
Empirical Require data to train in 
earlier stage. 
How to use GA to 
detect novel 
attacks. 
Anomaly based 
intrusion detection 
system. 
In our work we 
don‟t need to 
train data set to 
make a 
prediction. 
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Table 2.1-B: Summary of papers (3-5).  
 
# Reference 
id 
Setting Description of study 
design methodology 
Type of  
research 
Limitations Intervention Results Comments 
3. Gomathisa
nkaran et 
al, 2013 
Semantic web  Convert national 
vulnerability 
database into 
OKB. 
 Do a web search 
on each 
vulnerability.    
Empirical This framework is neither 
validated nor compares its 
results with other known 
vulnerability assessment 
tools. 
Using knowledge 
base in 
vulnerability 
assessment tool for 
cloud computing. 
Vulnerability 
assessment tool for 
cloud computing that 
uses ontology. 
 
4.  Khairkar  
A.D,2013 
Semantic web  Build ontology to 
classify web 
attacks. 
 Use the created 
ontology to 
identify zero day 
web attack. 
 Reduce false 
positive rate and 
high detection rate. 
 
Empirical Unable to detect complex 
web attack especially for 
complex e-business system. 
Using ontology 
knowledge base to 
detect web attacks. 
Intrusion detection 
system for web. 
 
5. Wang et 
al,2009 
Semantic web  Study standard 
network security 
classifier such as 
CWE, CPE, and 
CAPE. 
 Apply these 
standards to build 
ontology 
knowledge base.   
Empirical No automatic way to 
extract data from 
vulnerability database. 
Using  standard 
security classifier 
to build ontology 
knowledge base. 
Ontology knowledge 
base that classify 
vulnerabilities. 
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Table 2.1-C: Summary of papers (6-7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
# Reference 
id 
Setting Description of study 
design methodology 
Type of  
research 
Limitations Intervention Results Comments 
6. Wang et 
al,2009 
Semantic web  ontology approach 
to compute 
security metric 
Analytical  Formula used to 
compute score for 
each vulnerability 
based on how it is 
danger 
Ontological approach 
for security metric. 
 
7. Saad et al, 
2010 
Semantic web  Building forensic 
security tool based 
on ontology based 
on taxonomic 
relation and 
ontological 
relation. 
 Three types of 
knowledge 
specified to be 
presented: problem 
solving goals, 
problem solving 
knowledge and 
factual knowledge. 
Empirical Ontology construction is 
done manually. 
Using ontology 
technology to 
build security 
forensic tool. 
Prototype of smart 
forensic tool. 
Good for future 
work. 
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Table 2.1-D: Summary of papers (8-10).   
 
 
# Reference 
id 
Setting Description of study 
design methodology 
Type of  
research 
Limitations Intervention Results Comments 
8. Wu et al, 
2009 
Performance  Intrusion detection 
system that uses 
two devices: one 
for monitoring the 
traffic, capturing 
packets and 
decoding packets, 
and the other 
device for attack 
detection and 
analysis. 
Empirical This research shows how to 
improve the performance 
but it does not add anything 
new in detection or 
analysis. 
Distribute the 
services of 
intrusion detection 
system. 
Intrusion detection 
system. 
 
9. Uddin et 
al, 2010 
Performance  Splitting the IDS 
into multiple IDSs, 
so that each IDS is 
responsible for 
detecting and 
analysis only 
specific attacks 
signatures. 
Empirical Multiple IDSs devices are 
required. As the number of 
attacks signatures increases 
over time, we think this is 
not a practical design of 
IDS. 
Enhancing the 
speed of detection 
and analysis of 
intrusion detection 
system. 
Intrusion detection 
system. 
 
10. Bulajoul et 
al, 2013 
Performance  Measuring the 
amount of packets 
that can be 
captured and 
logged by a single 
snort IDS. 
Empirical   Recommendation to 
enhance the 
performance of IDS. 
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Table 2.1-E: Summary of papers (11-13).   
 
# Reference 
id 
Setting Description of study 
design methodology 
Type of  
research 
Limitations Intervention Results Comments 
11. Bairwa et 
al, 2014 
Information 
security 
 Introduce the most 
known 
vulnerability 
scanning tools. 
 Shows the strength 
of each of these 
tools 
Analytical Showing the features of 
known vulnerability tools 
in easy way. 
 Presented an easy way 
to show how we can 
use security tools in 
effective ways. 
 
12. Salini et al, 
2015 
Ontology  Constructed 
ontology to predict 
and classify web 
attacks. 
 The system 
suggests 
countermeasure 
for the predicted 
attacks 
 
Empirical  Ontology 
construction is 
done manually.  
 System only 
detects web 
attacks. 
Ontology is used 
to predict and 
classify the 
severity on each 
web attack 
predicted 
Ontology Knowledge 
Base to classify and 
predict web attacks. 
 
13. Elahi et al, 
2009 
  Proposed ontology 
to identify 
vulnerabilities, and 
the impact of these 
vulnerabilities on 
systems. 
Empirical  Ontology 
construction is 
done manually.  
 The results of 
attack prediction 
contain a lot of 
false alarm. 
Ontology is used 
to identify 
vulnerabilities. 
Ontology Knowledge 
Base for 
vulnerabilities 
identifications 
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This chapter gives us an overview of researches that has been performed on IDS, in term of 
making them smarter and more efficient. In addition, it showed us how to implement 
ontologies and semantic web technologies in the field of information security as in (Kotikela, 
Kavi , Gomathisankaran, & Singhal, 2013) and (D. Kshirsagar & Kumar, 2013). The next 
chapter shows how we implement these technologies, to present our smart system. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 Architecture 
 
This chapter proposes new analytical features for IDSs in DMZ zones. The analytical features 
were based on semantic web technologies, which is the core of knowledge-based discovery in 
modern systems. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates the algorithms and the mathematical 
formulas that were used to build the analytical engine. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Our proposed Smart Intrusion Detection System for DMZ specifically for DMZ zone uses 
ontology for creating, and displaying information about specific attacks that hit, or may hit the 
servers in the DMZ zone[s]. Our objectives were: to extract useful and needed security 
information from network traffic; to create a dynamic ontology model that serves in the DMZ 
needs; to create a strong analysis system that should be able to predict the incoming attacks; 
and  to be able to predict the systems in the DMZ that may be in danger. The proposed system 
consists of two machines; one for traffic sniffing and packets inspection, for which we used 
the best known open source Network Intrusion Detection System [NIDS] snort. On the other 
hand, the second machine contained the analysis engine that is the smart engine, which is 
responsible for displaying, querying and reasoning attacks information. Figure (3.1) 
demonstrates the placement of our proposed smart NIDS. 
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Figure 3.1: Placement of smart analysis engine. 
 
3.2 System Components 
 
The vulnerabilities were classified and grouped according to operating system and service 
type. Following subsections describe the system components and the communications between 
these components. Figure (3.2) shows the proposed system architecture, and its different 
components. 
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Figure 3.2: System architecture. 
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3.2.1. Database Preparer 
  
The database preparer has a main function, which is storing information about attacks that hit 
our system, using snort log. In addition, it stores information about servers in our network. 
The database preparer operates by reading snort logs, applying snort rule to the read logs, 
converting each attack ID into NVD ID, and finally storing the new attacks IDs information in 
the database. 
 
3.2.2. System Updater  
 
The system updater is a web component. It takes the new specified NVD XML file, and adds 
its content [entries] to our pre-defined Ontology Knowledge Base [OKB]. NVD is an 
international vulnerabilities database, which contains various information about security holes 
existing in software‟s or operating systems (Nist, 2016). In this module, the new XML NVD 
file is uploaded to our system, and then converted into RDF triple inside our OWL file to 
update our created OKB system.  
 
3.2.3. Structure Updater  
 
The structure updater is a web module which makes changes dynamically occurring inside a 
pre-built ontology [T-Box part]. It will add new class to the pre-built ontology dynamically 
through web interface. For instance, if a specific system service is a part of our system, and it 
is not defined on the built ontology, this service should be added to the system dynamically 
without any problem using this module. This will assist the administrator to add any new 
service to the system dynamically, without the need for development involvement.  Adding 
specific service class will improve and enhance the results for querying, retrieving information 
about specific vulnerabilities, and gives better results, since the service become a classified 
service, not a general service.  
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 3.2.4. Categorizer  
 
The categorizer is considered as coordinator in our proposed system. It is connected to various 
parts on the system, and it determines which data should be passed, and to what part. The 
categorizer consists of multiple web components [modules/methods]. Each component has its 
own functionality, in term of preparing, and determining the type of data that should be 
returned. In general, each component prepares the data to be processed and queried, then 
passes these data to a specific part [class] in the determiner, to do its work. After that, the 
determiner returned the information required. Finally the returned data is passed to the proper 
visualizer component, so the results of the required information will be displayed to the 
administrator. There are three main categorizer components. The first component is related to 
information about service[s]. Its function is to classify service[s] about server[s], then reading 
attacks from database that are related to service[s] which have been read, grouping this 
information, passing them to proper determiner class; to do its work by reasoning and query 
information from Ontology Knowledge Base [OKB], and return the results to specific 
visualizer component to display the results. The second component is concerned with related 
attacks. This component read attacks that hit specific service or system or all the systems in 
DMZ, then it group these attacks and passes them to specific determiner class for attacks 
results information. After that, the determiner passes this information to a proper visualizer 
method. The final component in the categorizer is the one that is connected directly to the 
visualizer. It reads attacks about specific service(s) or system(s) from database then passes the 
data directly to a specific visualizer method, to show the results. 
 
3.2.5. Determiner 
 
The determiner is software consisting of multiple java classes. Its main function is to work 
with the built OKB; in term of querying and extracting useful information‟s. Each categorizer 
component connects to one or multiple determiner class[es]. Each class is responsible for 
getting specific information ordered by categorizer module. After that, it groups the extracted 
information in a specific format, then passes the data to the visualizer module. One example of 
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a determiner class is a class that is concerned with related attacks information. Another 
example is the class concerned with grouping the predicted attacks related to an attack that 
might hit a service. A further example is the class that groups attacks information, and gets the 
services that might be related to these attacks. 
 
3.2.6. Visualizer  
 
The visualizer is the gate for the administrator to get the required results. It has multiple web 
components [modules/methods]. The main function of this module, is displaying the results in 
a web browser in a readable view. As well as determiner, each categorizer, or determiner 
component connects to one or multiple visualizer component. Each component in a visualizer 
is responsible for preparing the data received from the categorizer or determiner module in a 
specific format, calling the necessary Google visualization scripts, and visualizing the results. 
 
3.3 Workflow process  
 
3.3.1. System Initialization 
 
System initialization should be performed before working on the system. It is performed in 
two steps. The first step is done by adding the NVD database into our built ontology 
[skeleton], which reflects the most DMZs in term of operating systems and services. The 
structure of the system services can be changed according to our needs [section 3.3.1.3 update 
the system structure]. NVD contains information about all security holes that are discovered, 
and information about these threats as XML entries in XML file (Kotikela, Kavi , 
Gomathisankaran, & Singhal, 2013). Each vulnerability in the NVD is identified by an ID 
[CVE-ID]. We extract these XML entries, and apply them to our built ontology in this 
initialization step, so OKB is populated. This step should be performed at least once, to be 
able to fill our system with some data about vulnerabilities. The second step in system 
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initialization is to read snort logs, then apply snort CVE rules on attacks logged, to convert 
SNORT-ID into CVE-ID. After that, store this information in our database. This step is a 
continuous process as new attacks always hit the systems. After populating the OKB and 
filling the database with attacks, a specific action is required by administrator, so this action is 
translated into a query performed on a data stored in the database by a categorizer method then 
the returned data from categorizer passed to determiner class to get information about these 
data. The determiner continuously packs the results information then passes it to a visualizer 
method to display the results. Figure (3.3) shows how the flow of information in our proposed 
system. 
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Figure 3.3: Information flow chart in the proposed system. 
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3.4 Algorithm  
 
Each step in our algorithm has its own handlers and algorithm. The basic steps for our 
proposed semantic analysis engine for IDS are as follow: 
 
● Step 1: Prepare the inference engine. 
 
● Step 2: Input data from network traffic, and extract CVE‟s using CVE snort rule. 
 
● Step 3: Read CVE‟s from database and pass them to inference engine. 
 
● Step 4: The inference engine performs necessary data extraction from OKB. 
 
● Step 5: Return the extracted data to a handler function. 
 
● Step 6: Pass the data to the visualizer handlers. 
 
● Step 7: Display the results. 
 
Algorithm (3.1), shows pseudo code and mathematical formulas demonstrate the above steps. 
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Algorithm 3.1: Mathematical formula and pseudo code for the proposed system. 
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3.4.1. Prepare the Inference Engine 
 
In this step we prepared the inference engine. The inference engine performs the necessary 
query, and obtains useful information about specific attacks. The preparation of the inference 
engine was performed using three steps: building the ontology skeleton, updating the database 
signature of NVD, and updating the system structure. 
 
3.4.1.1. Building the Ontology Skeleton. 
 
Building ontology has no specific standards; it is usually built according to our needs. We 
followed standards used in (Wang & Guo, OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability Management, 
2009), and added our specific classes that are related to DMZ networks, which take into 
accounts the standards used in NVD XML file; such as: CPE, CWE, CVE, CVSS, and other 
network security standards. Figure (3.4) shows the main classes in our built ontology. We 
mainly used protégé tool to build the skeleton that can be changed dynamically according to 
our needs, as we will see in later section [3.4.1.2 Update the database signature of national 
vulnerability database]. 
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Our built ontology consists of the following classes: 
 
 Vulnerability class. Contains a security hole that may be exists in a software, or 
operating system, or hardware (Wang & Guo, OVM: An Ontology for 
Vulnerability Management, 2009). We defined the following  data properties for it: 
 
 hasVulnerabilityName. Contains the CVE-ID of the vulnerability individual. 
 
Figure 3.4: Ontology skeleton. 
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 hasVulnerabilityData. Contains to the data where this vulnerability individual 
is published. 
 
 hasVulnerbilityDescription. Contains additional useful information about the 
vulnerability; such as: how the vulnerability can be exploited. 
 
Vulnerability class has the following object properties, which were used to connect 
vulnerability individuals to others related individuals in OKB.  
 
 hasCVSSMetric. Connects vulnerability individual to its CVSS score 
individual. 
 
 hasAttackMechanism. Connects vulnerability individual to attack mechanism 
individual. 
 
 isAffectedITProduct. Connects vulnerability individual to all ITProducts 
individuals that is affected by this specific vulnerability. 
 
 hasAttack. Connects vulnerability individual to attack individual. 
 
 hasAttacker. Connects vulnerability individual to its corresponding Attacker 
individual. 
 
 CVSSMetric class. Contains a measurement that shows how dangerous the 
vulnerability is (Kotikela, Kavi , Gomathisankaran, & Singhal, 2013) (Nist, 2016). 
We defined three subclasses, which are: 
 
 CVSSHigh. Contains all individuals, for which if a vulnerability individual 
connects to it, is considered danger vulnerability. That means this vulnerability 
individual could result in catastrophic damage if it is exploited, and affects the 
data in term of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
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 CVSSMed. Contains all individuals, for which if a vulnerability individual 
connects to it is considered medium danger vulnerability. For example, it may 
affect availability only. 
 
 CVSSLow. Contains all individuals, for which if a vulnerability individual 
connects to it is considered low danger vulnerability. It means that it is an 
informational attack only. 
 
CVSSMetric class has the following data property:  
 
 hasCVSSScore. Contains numeric value of the vulnerability dangerous rank. 
 
 hasCVSSIntegrityImpact. Determines if the connected vulnerability 
individual with this CVSS score affected the integrity. It has three values which 
are: complete, meaning it affected the integrity. Partial, meaning it partially 
affected the integrity. None value, meaning it did not affect the integrity. 
 
 hasCVSSConfidintialityImpact. Determines if the connected vulnerability 
individual with this CVSS score affected the confidentiality. It has three values: 
complete, meaning it affected the confidentiality. Partial, meaning it partially 
affected the confidentiality. None value, meaning it did not affect the 
confidentiality. 
 
 hasCVSSAvailabilityImpact. Determines if the connected vulnerability 
individual with this CVSS score affected the availability. It has three values: 
complete, meaning it affected the availability. Partial, meaning it partially 
affected the availability. None value, meaning it did not affect the availability. 
 
CVSSMetric has one object property, which is isCVSSMetricPartOf. This property is 
an inverse of object property hasCVSSMetric. 
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 Attack class. Contains the common method that is used to exploit a system (Wang 
& Guo, OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability Management, 2009). We defined a 
data property isAttack for it, which may have one of the following common values: 
remote value, meaning the vulnerability individual connected to this attack, can be 
exploited remotely. Authenticated value, meaning that the vulnerability individual 
connected to this attack individual can be exploited if the attacker is part of domain 
users. Attack class has an object property isExploitOf, which is an inverse of 
hasAttack object property. 
 
 Attacker class. Describes software or a human, who has a reason to compromise 
the computer system (Wang & Guo, OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability 
Management, 2009).It has the following subclasses: 
  
 Context-dependent. Contains individuals of attackers, who have to be part of a 
system domain, to compromise the vulnerabilities; such as: the attacker should 
be authenticated to windows active directory domain. 
 
 Guest. Contains individuals of attackers who don't have to login to a system, to 
compromise the vulnerabilities in it. For example, guest login in a website. 
 
 Local. Contains individuals of an attacker who has to be part of a local user in 
a system, to compromise certain vulnerabilities in it. For instance, a local user 
account in Unix/Linux system. 
 
 Man-in-the-middle. Contains individuals of attackers who should be able to 
intercept the network traffic. 
 
 Physical. Contains individuals of attackers who have physical access to the 
system. 
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 Remote. Contains individuals of attackers who can remotely compromise a 
system. Such as: SQL injection attack against a website. 
 
 Uncategorized. Contains individuals of attackers who have no certain or 
specific classification. 
 
Attacker class has a data property isAttacker, which display the types of attacker in a 
string. This class has an object property isAttackerOf, which is an inverse of object 
property hasAttacker. 
 
  AttackerMechanism class. Individuals from this class contain information about 
the mechanism used by attackers, to exploit certain vulnerabilities. This class has 
one data property called hasActiveLocation, which contains information about a 
certain vulnerability exploitation method. For instance, a certain file in JOOMLA 
sites is hacked by certain commands. AttackMechanism class has object property 
isAttackMechanismOf, which is an inverse of object property 
hasAttackMechanism. 
 
  ITProduct class. Contains a group of products that is affected by vulnerability. It 
has the following subclasses: 
 
 OS class. Contains all individuals of type ITProduct, that has a vulnerability 
affecting the operating system or application related to a defined operating 
system. It has the following subclasses: 
 
 Microsoft class. Contains all individuals that affected Microsoft 
operating systems. It also has a subclass called Microsoftservices that 
contains all individuals of vulnerability products that affects Microsoft 
services. It has subclasses DotNet, LDAP, Exchange, IIS, 
NTPMicrosoft, SMB, and others. 
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 Unix class. Contains all individuals that affected Unix/Linux like 
operating system. It also has a subclass called Unixservices, that 
contains all individuals of vulnerability products that affect Unix system 
services. It contains subclasses Postfix, Samba, Zimbra, SSH and 
others. 
 
 OSUnknown class. Contains all individuals that affected systems other 
than Unix or Windows like operating system. For example Apple IOS. 
 
 Software class. Contains all products individuals of services that may exist in 
both Unix like systems and Microsoft systems. For instance, Apache Web 
Server is an application that may be installed on both Unix and Windows 
operating system. It has several subclasses; such as Tomcat, PHP, Oracle, 
Apache, and others. 
 
 Hardware class. Contains all individuals of products that may be affected by 
physical attacks. This class is out of the scope of our research. 
 
ITProduct class has an isITProduct data property which contains a literal of all 
products affected by certain vulnerability. It has the following object property: 
 
 isAffectedITProduct object property. This is an inverse of hasVulnerability 
object property. 
 
 isVendorOf object property. This is used to links ITProduct indvidual to 
ITVendor indvidual class. 
 
 ITVendor class. Contains information about the supplier of ITProduct individual 
(Wang & Guo, OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability Management, 2009). It has a 
data property isAvendor, which contains a string of information about the supplier 
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of a specific ITProduct individual. It has an object property hasVendor that is an 
inverse of isVendorOf object property. 
 
3.4.1.2. Update the Database Signature of NVD 
 
NVD is an XML format file; it is updated frequently by NIST organization. In order to be able 
to query and inference the vulnerabilities that hit our systems, we converted these XML files 
into RDF/OWL triples that match our built ontology. Figure (3.5) shows how the XML file 
was added to our ontology. Algorithm (3.2) shows pseudo code and mathematical formulas 
that demonstrates how an updating database signature was performed. 
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Algorithm 3.2: mathematical formula and pseudo code for updating system vulnerabilities 
signature.
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Figure 3.5: Adding XML entries into built ontology. 
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3.4.1.2.1. Detailed Algorithm 
 
The NVD database is continuously updated, so the database signature updater is a continuous 
process. The implementation of this module was performed using four major steps. These 
steps were implemented using PHP scripting language, specifically using simpleXML library 
for data extracting from XML feed, and easyRDF library to deals with RDF triples and OWL 
files. These steps can be summarized as follow: 
 
 Read NVD xml file then parse each entry in it. 
 
 If the entry does not already exists in our built OKB, then:  
 
 The placement and the conversion of Vulnerability and ITVendor are 
performed normally, by calling a handler method to each type. The handlers 
will extract the objects from the the XML file then convert them in to RDF 
triple.  
           
 The extraction of CVSS score is performed by calling CVSS handler method. 
This handler checks the type of CVSSscore according to its score value. After 
that, it places an entry individual according to that score, then links this 
individual to the vulnerability individual using object property hasCVSSMetric. 
The value of the CVSS score is determined according to the following three 
values; CVSSHigh, in the case if the score value of the attack is greater than 
7.0. CVSSMed, if the score value of vulnerability in rang of 4.0-6.9, and 
finally, CVSSLow if score value between ranges 0 - 3.9.  
 
 The placement of Attackmechanism, Attacker, and Attack individuals are done 
by applying lexical analysis code, to summary part for each XML entries in 
NVD file. So the information extracted about the attack mechanism, attacker, 
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and attack are linked to vulnerability individual by hasAttackMechanism, 
hasAttacker and hasAttack accordingly.  
                                       
 Placement of products is performed by calling the product handler method, in 
which the products are categorized according to operating system and 
application type that were built by protégé, and can be can be changed and 
edited dynamically as we will see later [section 3.4.1.3 Update the system 
structure]. For example, let's say that a vulnerability CVE-123 that may hit an 
Apache web server, and it can also hit an IIS web server. In this situation, the 
product handler method should place two individuals in the product class; one 
under Apache class, and the other one under IIS class. It should then link each 
individual of those classes with object property hasVulnerability to CVE-123.  
 
 The placement of ITVendor indvidual is performed by calling the ITVendor 
handler. After that, the handler links the extracted individual to ITProduct 
individual using hasITVendor object property. 
     
 Publish the RDF graph, update the OKB, and commit the changes to OWL file. 
 
3.4.1.3. Update the System Structure 
 
In this module of our proposed analysis engine for intrusion detection engine, we allowed the 
network administrator to update the skeleton of the ontology [T-Box] dynamically. We created 
this step to allow the system to be flexible, according to the changes that occurs in an 
organization. This means that the organization does not have to call the developer every time a 
change occurs in its infrastructure. Furthermore, given that technologies always changes, and 
the need for new services always appears, it does not make any sense to call a developer, 
every time an organization needs to add new service to its infrastructure. We built the skeleton 
of ontology based on well-known services that are common and exist on the most DMZs. But 
each organization has its own needs, and for that we added this feature to allow organization 
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to add its required services, to provide better query and reasoning about the attack that may 
have hit the added service, or any other related services. Since individuals of unclassified 
service or a service that does not belong to a certain class, go to a general class called 
Software class providing inferior results, when administrator requires information about that 
service. On the other hand, applying this step will allow the whole structure to be changed. 
Thus, it requires erasing all the NVD XML, and re-entering them, to allow the entries to be 
fitted to match the new ontology structure. Figure (3.6) demonstrates the mechanism used in 
this module. Algorithm (3.3) shows the mathematical formulas, and pseudo code for this 
module.  
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Figure 3.6: Mechanism in structure update. 
   59 
 
 
 
Algorithm 3.3: Structure updates pseudo code and mathematical formula. 
 
We scripted this module using PHP scripting language, and easyRDF to deal with OWL files. 
The following steps are followed to complete this module: 
 
 Administer the request to add new service.  
In this step we allow the administrator to choose from three options to add new service 
in the created ontology. The first choice is adding a Windows service. The second 
choice is for if the request requires adding Unix/Linux service. The last option, if it is a 
common service, which may work on both Unix/Linux and Windows operating 
systems. 
 
 Open the structure OWL file for editing. 
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According to the choice made by the administrator in the first step, we add necessary 
headers to the ontology structure OWL file.  
 
 Erase all RDF entries from our OKB file. 
 
 Copy new structure from structure OWL file to our new OKB file. 
 
 Re-enter all the NVD xml files, and updates the OKB file, using the update NVD 
database module for all saved NVD xml files. 
 
3.4.1.4. Input Data from Network Traffic and Extract CVE’s 
 
Traffic that passes through The DMZ normally is an active continuous process. Snort, which is 
an open source network intrusion detection system, plays a critical role in our proposed 
system. It sniffs network traffic and log security attacks into a database. In conclusion of this 
process, each attack which occurred has an ID given to it by snort. In the proposed system we 
take a security logs from snort log, then apply snort CVE‟s rule to it, which  is a PHP script 
that converts snort ID to CVE‟s ID, so that we can extract additional information‟s about 
attacks in the analysis engine, figure (3.7) demonstrates this step. The following algorithm 
(3.4) explains the procedure performed in this module.  
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Algorithm 3.4: Converting Snort log to CVE log pseudo code. 
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 Figure 3.7: Input Data from Network Traffic and Extract CVE‟s. 
 
3.4.1.5. Reading CVE’s and preparing the Data  
 
The categorizer in our proposed system is responsible for reading CVE‟s and other 
information from the database. In addition, it is responsible for categorizing these data and 
passing them to the determiner or the visualizer -step 3 and step 5 in the algorithm [section 
3.4.1.3.1]. All categorizer methods were written in PHP scripting language. Figure 4.2 shows 
how a categorizer module works. As mentioned before [section 3.2.4], there are three main 
categorizer methods, which are methods that concerned  with services, methods that concerned 
about related attacks, and methods that connect directly to the visualizer. Each method is 
invoked according to the type of data required by the administrator, to be displayed and 
visualized. 
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3.4.1.5.1. Methods that Concerned About the Services  
 
These methods are concerned with displaying information about attacks that hit a single 
service or group of services, in one system or multiple systems. These methods can be 
categorized into three subcategories. The first methods category is concerned with all system 
services in the whole DMZ. The second category is concerned with attacks that may be used 
to hit a single service. The third group is the same as second group, but for multiple services. 
This categorization was performed, because each category has its own way of preparing data 
read from the database. Furthermore, each method has its own protocol, for sending data to the 
determiner class. 
The following algorithm (3.5) is used by methods that are concerned about all the services in 
the DMZ from the begging of getting data to display results. 
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Algorithm 3.5: Pseudo code used by Methods that Concerned About the Services. 
 
In the first two steps in our algorithm, we normally read system services and pack them using 
as followed format; service1#service2#.......servicen.  
 
The second and the third subcategories are the same as first one. Conversely, they are different 
in the way they communicate with its cross bonding determiner classes, as we mentioned early 
in this section. For example, the following protocol is used to communicate if we want to keep 
track of a server, to determine which service belongs to what server: 
service1@IPn#servicen@IP1#servicen@Pn+1.  
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3.4.1.5.2. Methods that Concerned About the Related Attacks 
 
These methods use almost the same steps algorithm used in methods related to services. But 
here we have additional two steps, which are reading attacks from snort database, and keeping 
track of these attacks. So the modified algorithm 3.6 will be as follows: 
 
 
Algorithm 3.6: Pseudo code used by Methods that Concerned About the Related Attacks. 
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In step two in the algorithm, we read attacks that hit a particular system service, or a group of 
systems services from snort database. After that, we group these data, which are about attacks 
with data about systems services in a predefined format then sending the packed data to a 
determiner class. These methods were categorized according to number of systems services, 
since we want to get information about attacks that hit services, or getting the ranks of the 
attacks that hit these systems services. On the other hand, all of these methods followed the 
same sequences, but with some differences in the parameters, and protocols used in sending 
data to the determiner class. The protocol used in sending the data is;  
 service1@IPn<cve1,cve2 …… cven>#servicen@IP1<cve1,cve2 …… 
cven>#servicen@Pn+1<cve1,cve2 …… cven>. 
 
3.4.1.5.3. Methods that Connected Directly to the Visualizer 
 
These methods are considered the simplest. They require neither grouping for data, nor 
creating a protocol of passing data to the determiner class, since it does not call any determiner 
class. These methods make a normal query to data from snort database to get information 
about attacks. After that, it passes the requested data directly to the required visualizer method, 
to display the results.  
 
3.4.1.6. Querying and Inference Necessary Information from OKB 
 
The determiner is the system module responsible for dealing with OKB, in terms of query and 
getting necessary information.  It is consists of multiple java classes, each with its own 
functionality in terms of unpacking the data taken from categorizer, querying the data from 
OKB, and packing the results back to the visualizer. These classes uses Jena library, a set of 
java classes that are programed to deal with semantic web technology. It also has a group of 
APIs to read, query and inference OKB. In addition, this library has a built in capability that 
allows easy interaction with a different type of reasoner, such as PELLET, HAMLIT, and 
others (Semantic Web, 2012) (Apache Jena, 2015). As mentioned before, each categorizer 
method has one or more cross ponding determiner class. For instance, service method [section 
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3.4.1.5] has multiple sub categorizes; each subcategory connects to only one class from the 
determiner. In this module we also categorized the determiner classes into two subcategories; 
one category contains all service related classes, and the other category is attacks related 
classes. 
  
3.4.1.6.1. Classes Related to Services 
 
In this group of classes, the types of information that will be queried are the information‟s 
about attacks that might hit a system service, or group of systems services. The main steps 
used in these classes can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Step 1: Read the data passed from the categorizer method. 
 
 Step 2: Extract these data into variables. 
 
 Step 3: Build the necessaries query, using SPARQL and different reasoners. 
 
 Step 4: Pack the data in a special format. 
 
 Step 5: Pass the data back to visualizer method. 
 
Each determiner class gets the data from categorizer method in a special format. The first 
thing which should be performed is to unpack these data as we mentioned in earlier sections, 
each categorizer packing the data in a special format then passing the packed data to a 
determiner class. The next steps should be reading it and querying it. Finally, it must use its 
own packing method, to prepare the data to be returned for the visualized method. For 
example, the query related java class reads the systems services passed to it, and then builds 
queries to get information about the attacks that might hit these services. After that, the 
information will be returned to the visualizer method in the following format: 
$ListOfReslated[] = serv1, $ListOfReslated[]= $cve2, and so on.  
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Another example is if we want to display the related attacks that might hit a service or a group 
of services. It uses almost the same procedures used in related system services. But here the 
communication protocol in returning the information data is different. The protocol used in 
this class is as follow: Service1[] = CVE1#ProductsHit,  Service1[] = CVE2#ProductsHit …..  
Servicen[] = CVEn#ProductsHit.  
 
3.4.1.6.2. Classes Related to Attacks 
 
These types of classes are concerned with returning information about attacks that are related 
to an attack, or getting the CVSS metrics of attacks. Classes from this category, followed the 
same steps used by classes related to the services, but, with changes in type of query and 
inclusion of CVSS score. In addition, the protocols used in these classes are quite different. 
One example is the class that is concerned with getting all the attacks that might hit our 
systems, with the rank of each attack shown in the result. The following protocol is used in 
this class, to pass the result information back to the visualizer. 
ServiceName1CVSSType1[] = cve1 , ServiceName1CVSSType1[]= cve2, …., 
ServiceNamenCVSSTypen[]=cven.  
3.4.1.7. Prepare Data to be Displayed and Visualized  
 
The visualizer module is responsible for displaying the results in a nice GUI. It accepts the 
data that are passed by the determiner class. It is consist of multiple web methods that were 
written in PHP scripting language.  Each method uses a different Google visualization library 
to display the results in different views. Google visualization library is a set of scripts that are 
written by Google Co. to display data in a nice visualized view. Each library has its own data 
format, which should be followed to visualize the results. We followed Google‟s guide to 
prepare and display our data results (Google org, 2015). The following subsections 
demonstrate some of the visualization methods that were used in our proposed system. 
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3.4.1.7.1. Pie Chart Method 
 
We used these kinds of charts to display information about the attacks that might hit systems 
services, and the attacks that already hit systems services. We accepted the data from the 
determiner methods, specifically from the methods that are related to the services, prepare the 
information accepted, and finally display the results. 
    
3.4.1.7.2. Annotation Chart Method 
 
This method displays the data in a time line view. We used this type of chart to display attacks 
statistics that occurred before a specific date time. In other words, this method displays 
historical information about attacks. This method accepts data from the attack related 
determiner method then performs necessary preparation to the data before displaying it.  
 
3.4.1.7.3. Word Trees Chart Method 
 
This method displays the result in a word trees format. We used this method to display related 
systems services that might be in danger in our DMZ. This method accepts its data from an 
attacks related service determiner methods.  
 
3.4.1.7.4. Column Chart Method 
 
This method is the same as the pie chart method. However, it has minimal changes in data 
preparation.  
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3.4.1.7.5. Organization Chart Method 
 
This method takes its data directly from the categorizer method. For that, it is considered the 
fastest method that displays result for the administrator.  
 
3.5 Summary  
  
The goal of this chapter is to show how the semantic analytical engine for IDS was developed. 
Also, we showed the procedures followed to make the system semantically analyze each 
attack logged, so it can perform prediction about incoming attacks or services that might be in 
danger. In addition, we explained how semantic connection between IDSs and NVDs was 
made.  
 
This chapter shows the steps needed to be performed on each attack logged, before visualizing 
the results. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates the algorithms and mathematical formulas that we 
used to build the analytical engine. In addition, we showed that the predictions are based on 
predefined criteria‟s that are passed, to be queried. 
 
Then next chapter shows how we validated our system using real data (from KDDCup99 
dataset). Furthermore, explain how we measured the performance of our system using a 
queening model, and Anylogic simulation tool. 
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Chapter 4 
 
System Validation 
 
In the previous chapter we showed how we built our prototype using PHP scripting language, 
and Jena java library. In this chapter we will show how our prototype was validated using 
three different techniques. The first technique is by validating our system using KDDCup99 
dataset. KDD is considered the main source of attacks that hit the DMZ system. On the other 
hand, the source of vulnerability attacks information is the NVD database. We used the NVD 
database from 2002 to 2008 in the implementation of our experiments, which it's stored in the 
OKB as discussed earlier [chapter 3].  The second technique is the queuing model, which we 
used to validate our system in a heavy multi-user environment. The Anylogic simulator was 
the last technique we used to validate the system. Furthermore, in this chapter we present 
some of the web user pages that are shown to the administrator. 
 
4.1 KDDCup99 Experimental Data 
 
 KDDCup99 is the most widely used data for evaluating and validating the intrusion detection 
systems. In our experiments, we used these data; to predict attacks related to attacks stored in 
this dataset. The Defense Advanced Research projects Agency [DARPA] and Air force 
Research Laboratory [AFRL], MIT Lincoln Laboratory had collected these large datasets from 
real networks, for the evaluation of computer network intrusion detection systems (Panda & 
Patra, 2007). 
We used and queried the data in this dataset, to predict new and related attacks from the 
created OKB. We performed different tests on these data to get predicted attacks based on the 
tests requested. These experiments were performed on an Intel dual core 3.0 GH machine, 
with 3 GB memory, and a PHP java support environment. The tested machine has the 
following services enabled on it; snmp, internet_information_server, frontpage and 
pdg_shopping_carte [in CPE format]. 
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4.1.1. Measuring the Accuracy of attack prediction 
 
The main source of attacks predictions is our created OKB; we use it to predict the attacks 
related to the stored sniffed attacks, by using ontology inferences reasoners and SPARQL 
queries.  The predictions are based on the reasoners to extracted additional facts about specific 
attacks; we depend on four metrics passed to reasoners to extract information which are:  
CVSSScore, AttackMechanism, Attacker, and products. We performed three tests and 
manipulate the threshold of these parameters. 
 
4.1.1.1. Predictions based on two parameters  
 
In this test we pass four parameters [which are mentioned earlier], and we limit the threshold 
of the resoners to two, which means that if two parameters that are passed or more match in 
the OKB, it return vulnerability as predicted attack; i.e. if for example vulnerability CVE-123 
that are sniffed and logged has a CVSSScore is high, Attacker type is remote, 
AttackMechanism is by .htaccess file, and the vulnerable product is Apache server 1.3. The 
reasoners will check the OKB files if two or more of the above information is true for the 
vulnerabilities inside it, For instance if CVE-456 inside OKB affected Apache Server 1.3, and 
has CVSScore high the resoner will ignore the Attacker type and Attack Mechanism and 
return that CVE-456 is predicted attack for CVE-123. Table (4.1) shows the results of 
prediction for services if we limit the threshold of reasoners to two. 
 
Table 4.1: Two parameters metric for accuracy prediction 
Service name   Predicted 
True 
alarm 
False 
alarm 
Accuracy 
percentage 
snmp  17 4 13 23.5% 
internet_information_server 11 2 9 22.3% 
frontpage 45 31 14 68.8% 
pdg_shopping_carte 3 2 1 66.6% 
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4.1.1.2. Predictions based on three parameters  
 
We repeat the same experiment as in [section 4.1.1.1]. But in this experiment we made the 
threshold of reasoners to three instead of two. In other word, must at least three of passed 
parameter be true to return an attack as predicted attack. Table (4.2) shows the result of 
prediction based on three parameters. 
 
Table 4.2: Three parameters metric for accuracy prediction 
Service name   Predicted 
True 
alarm 
False 
alarm 
 Accuracy 
percentage 
snmp  9 4 5 44.4% 
internet_information_server 2 2 0 100% 
frontpage 39 31 8 79.5% 
pdg_shopping_carte 2 2 0 100% 
 
 
4.1.1.3. Predictions based on four parameters  
 
We repeat the same experiment as in [sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2]. On the contrary, in this 
experiment we made the threshold of reasoners to four, i.e. the four passed parameters must be 
true to return an attack as predicted attacks. Table (4.3) shows the result of prediction based on 
four parameters. The only misses that occurs in frontpage service for example is because the 
value of attacker type does not exists in original NVD XML file that was converted into RDF 
triple [the summary part of the original XML file does not contains information about 
attacker], so that the reasoners added a virtual value from the passed attacker attribute value 
and made it the value that is missed. 
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Table 4.3: Four parameters metric for accuracy prediction. 
Service name   Predicted 
True 
alarm 
False 
alarm 
Accuracy 
percentage 
snmp  5 4 1 80% 
internet_information_server 2 2 0 100% 
frontpage 34 31 3 91.2% 
pdg_shopping_carte 2 2 0 100% 
 
 
From the results of three experiments we can see if we increase the threshold of reasoners, the 
prediction accuracy increased.  But, the attacks relation between different services will be 
decreased, thus if we concerned about attacks relation we can safely increase the threshold of 
the reasoners. 
 
4.1.1.4. Comparing the results with other systems 
 
We compare the results of inferences made by reasoners [reasnoer threshold = 4] used in our 
system with two other systems that are used reasoners for attacks prediction (Salini & 
Shenbagam, 2015)  and ( Elahi, Yu, & Zannone, 2009) , also we compare our approach with 
other system that uses other datamining algorithms [GA] (Hoque, Mukit, & Bikas, 2012) for 
attacks prediction.  Table (4.4) shows the result of comparisons. 
 
Table 4.4: System comparisons. 
System Used Prediction Accuracy 
Our System 92.8% 
Other OKB infernces 1 84.6% 
Other  OKB infernces  2 70.5% 
Using GA 53% 
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As we can see from the results our system gives the best results because the prediction 
depends on two sources of data semantically connected for attack prediction, not as other 
systems that use pre trained data to do prediction, nor uses pre built ontology to predict attacks 
from normal network traffic. Thus, this makes the system more practical to be applied for 
production environment. 
 
4.2 Queuing Model  
 
To validate our proposed system in other way, rather than using KDDCup99 benchmark, we 
considered modeling our system using a queuing model. Queuing model is a mathematical 
model (Wikipedia, 2016) (Belch, Greiner, de Meer, & Trivedi, Queueing Networks and 
Markov Chains, 1998), which we used in our proposed system to predict waiting time and 
how much time each request is takes to be processed, by different modules of the system.  
 
As mentioned earlier we have three modules, so we must have three different queues: 
categorizer, determiner and visualizer queues. Each request [query requested by 
administrator], comes to the system in the form of 2000 rows per query [i.e. we limit the query 
to only 2000 rows per request, which we found good in term of time required for processing. 
Table (4.5) demonstrates different chunk sizes and the time required by different part to 
process it, the time taken by determiner was unchanged, because, the data set contains 
replicated attacks extracted and filtered before entered this module].  
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Table 4.5: Time Required to process different sizes of requests at same time. 
Number of 
attacks per 
request 
Time in 
categorizer(Sec) 
Time in 
determiner(Sec) 
Time in 
visualizer(Sec) 
Total 
time(Sec) 
Number of 
attacks per 
request 
500 3.82 1.4 1.014 6.234 500 
1000 6.6 1.4 1.033 9.033 1000 
2000 13.8 1.4 1.064 16.264 2000 
4000 25.9 1.4 1.13 28.43 4000 
6000 37.8 1.4 1.22 40.42 6000 
8000 56.7 1.4 1.32 59.42 8000 
 
These requests enter the categorizer first and are grouped by it, then mostly go to determiner, 
and finally to visualizer to display results. However, in some cases these grouped requests go 
to the visualizer directly from categorizer, to display the information grouped.  So each request 
consists of a chunk of rows [2000 rows], and it is treated as one request by the system. These 
requests come to our system in a poison distribution in average, with one request each second; 
since we know that in each network there is a peak time and normal and we care about events 
that are arrive. In our system, we can use Jackson open network model, to present our system, 
because the system consists of multiple queues. In addition, the requests come from outside 
the system. Figure (4.1) below shows the queuing model for our proposed system. 
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Figure 4.1: System queue model. 
 
So, we have three queues; each queue in our system is an m|m|1|∞ queue, since the requests 
come to our system in a poison distribution, with an average of one request per second. We 
have one server in each queue, to serve the requests. In addition, each queue type is a FIFO 
and we have infinite queue size for each queue in the system. The following information 
represents data obtained by performing sample query on KDD data set, and it records how 
much time each component  require to perform  the necessary data processing. From these 
data we could predict the behavior of the proposed system, so that we can estimate how much 
each requests required to be processed. Furthermore, the throughput of a busy system, the 
utilization of the system, the probability of the system being idle, and other useful information 
shows us how the system will reacts in a busy environment. In the following calculations: q1 
represent categorizer, q2 represent determiner and q3 represent visualizer. 
 
λ1 = 1/seconds [chunk of 2000] [rate of arrival for q1], µ1 = 13.8 sec [service time for q1] 
 
λ2 = 0.9 * 1 = 0.9 [rate of arrival for q2], µ2= 1.4 sec [service time for q2] 
 
λ3 = 0.1 * 1  + 0.9  = 1 [rate of arrival for q3], µ3= 1.064 sec [service time for q3] 
 
● Total throughput = 2.9 requests. 
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● Expected number of requests in the system (L) 
By using the normalization condition we can see that this geometric sum is convergent, 
iff λ/µ < 1 = P, Thus:-  
P(q1) = 0.07 (λ1/µ1) for queue1. 
P(q2) = 0.64 (λ2/µ2) for queue2. 
P(q3) = 0.9 (λ3/µ3) for queue3. 
L(q1) =  0.075 (expected number of requests in queue q1). 
L(q2) =  1.77 (expected number of requests in queue q2). 
L(q3) =  9 (expected number of requests in queue q3). 
L = 0.075 + 1.77 + 9 = 10.8 requests is the Expected number of requests in the system. 
 
● Waiting time for the next request to be served (W) 
w(q1) =  0.075 second in q1. 
w(q2) =  1.96 second in q2. 
w(q3) =  9 second in q3. 
W = 0.075 + 1.96 + 9  = 11.04 second Waiting time for the next request to be served. 
 
●  Probability of the system being idle 
p(0,0,0) = 0.93 * 0.36 * 0.1 = 0.03348 
3.3% the system is being idle. 
  
● Probability of the system is busy 
p = (1 – p0) = 0.967 
96% the system is busy. 
  
● Expected number of requests in the categorizer 
Lq(q1)  = Ls(q1) – P(q1) =  0.05 requests. 
  
● Expected waiting time spend in the categorizer 
Wq(q1) = Lq(q1)   /  λ1 = 0.05 seconds 
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● Expected number of requests in the determiner 
Lq(q2)  = Ls(q2) – P(q2) =  1.13 requests. 
  
●  Expected waiting time spend in the categorizer 
Wq(q1) = Lq(q1)   /  λ2 = 0.57 seconds 
  
● Expected number of requests in the visualizer 
Lq(q3)  = Ls(q3) – P(q3) =  8.1 
  
● Expected waiting time spend in the categorizer 
Wq(q1) = Lq(q1)   /  λ3 = 8.1 seconds 
  
●  The probability that are at least two requests in the system 
p(n ≥ 2 ) = 1 – p0 – p1 = 0.913 
91% there are two requests in the system 
  
● The probability that there are five requests in the system 
p(5) = P^5 p0 =  0.361 
36% five requests exist in the system. 
 
4.3 Simulating the System using Anylogic 
 
Anylogic is simulation software; it provides an easy way to predict the behavior of a system. It 
has an easy way to display and simulate an event-based system (anylogic, 2016), the same as 
our proposed system. We simulated our system using Anylogic, with enterprise tools to 
present event processes in our system, and to implement our queuing model in a trusted 
simulation tool. Also, we used analysis tools to display statistics and the expectation of our 
proposed system. Furthermore, we used java classes to keep a track of events occurred, while 
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simulating our system. The code snippet below shows how we used java classes in anylogic, 
to keep a track of a total waiting time in the queues, before displaying the results. 
 
 
           double startWaiting; 
 double enteredSystem;  
 double startWaitingDet; 
 double startWaitingVis; 
 double currentTime; 
                 …………….. 
               entity.currentTime = time()-entity.enteredSystem;  
                …..repeated for each queue 
               timeInSystemDistr.add(time()-entity.enteredSystem); 
 
 
Figure (4.2), shows the implementation, and results of simulating our system in Anylogic 
software. 
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Figure 4.2: Simulating the system using Anylogic. 
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4.4 System User Interface 
 
The user interface that is displayed to the network administrator consists of; PHP files that are 
connected to Google visualization libraries, to display information easily and nicely. The main 
user pages are the annotation bar page, the service display page, the dashboard page and the 
system update or upgrade page. 
 
4.4.1. Annotation Bar Page 
 
This page display the information in a timeline, to allow the administrator to choose the date, 
for which attacks occurred in a specific system with all services enabled on it. Figure (4.3) 
shows the annotation bar page.  
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   Figure 4.3: Annotation bar page.
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4.4.2. Service Display Page 
 
In this page the information is displayed according to a specific service, for the entire DMZ in 
specific date time interval. It displays information in a bar chart format for a group of events 
which occurred in slots of dates. Figure (4.4) below demonstrates how information is 
displayed for a specific service. 
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Figure 4.4: Service display page. 
   86 
 
4.4.3. Dashboard Page  
 
This main page displays three kind of information. The first type of information is about the 
dangerous attacks that hit the system services. The second type is to display prediction 
statistics, about the attacks that may make our system vulnerable. The final type of 
information is to display the severity and the risk of each attack that hit system services. The 
first two types of information are displayed in pie chart format, and the later one displayed in a 
percentage bar chart. Figure (4.5) shows these charts. 
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Figure 4.5: Dashboard page. 
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4.4.4. System Updates / Upgrade page 
 
The system update / upgrade page, allows the administrator to update the vulnerabilities 
database signature, by adding the latest vulnerability database. It also allows the administrator 
to update the structure of the system to better suit the organization‟s needs. Figures (4.6) 
below demonstrate the mechanism of how the system can be updated or upgraded. 
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Figure 4.6: System updates / upgrades process. 
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4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter examined the proposed system by some experiments, and discussed the results 
for these experiments. We had validated our system in three different ways; KDDCup99, 
queuing model, and Anylogic simulation.  
 
The results of validating the system using KDDCup99 show that if we increase the threshold 
of the reasoners the attack prediction increased. Furthermore, the results show that if the 
number of attacks increased [queried], the processing time increased.  
 
Measuring the performance using queuing model, shows that 96% of the time the system will 
be busy.  
 
Simulating the system in Anylogic enterprise tools, shows same results as showed in queuing 
model. 
 
In this chapter we continuously presented some of important page designs that are used in the 
system. In next chapter, we will conclude, summarize, and suggest some of the future work for 
the system. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 Summary and Future Work 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis. A review of the importance of the system is presented with 
focus on the main contributions, results, limitations and assumptions, and possible future 
work. 
 
In our thesis we modeled a new analysis engine in intrusion detection system for DMZs. 
DMZs are known as the most important part in the network for each enterprise organization. 
Our system depends on OKB; which was built based on the basics of the network security 
attributes [chapter 3], to perform predictions about attacks. We automated the process of 
extracting useful attacks information, in addition to updating the knowledge of our smart 
engine by automating the processes of updating and upgrading the system. We believe that 
adding OKB to the intrusion detection system adds a certain values in terms of making it 
smarter. This also adds valuable characteristics to the system, in terms of making NIDS 
perform predictions, which are based on multiple attributes. Thus, the predictions are more 
accurate [chapter 4]. 
The rest of this chapter presents the conclusion, including contributions, summary of results, 
limitations and assumptions. It also presents potential research areas for future work. 
 
5.1 Contribution  
 
In our research, we have two main contributions: extracting useful information that 
semantically connects snort network intrusion detection system [IDS] logs, and the National 
Vulnerability Database [NVD] using semantic web technology, so that the signature based 
IDSs become almost anomaly based IDSs because of the prediction ability. The other 
contribution is to automate the way of updating ontology structure that is specialized for 
computer network services. These contributions are summarized in the following subsections. 
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5.1.1. Extracting Useful Information from Snort NIDS and NVD 
 
In our proposed system we have two main sources of information; snort logs, which are 
sniffed from the network traffic then logged, and the NVD vulnerabilities databases that are 
converted into Ontology Knowledge Base [OKB]. In the smart analysis engine for DMZ, we 
read the attacks which hit our systems from snort logs, after that reasoning and querying these 
attacks from the stored OKB file, to get extra useful information about each attack recorded. 
 
5.1.2. Automatic Ontology Updates 
 
OKB in analytic engine represent the heart of it because from it we can predict and extract 
additional useful information about vulnerabilities attacks. OKB consists of two parts; the 
schema part [T-Box], and the data part [A-Box]. Ontology in our system represents the 
schema and the relations between vulnerabilities and services. Ontology should be created 
carefully, since it reflects the structure where the data should be placed. Ontology creation in 
most cases is performed by specialized tools; such as protégé. The skeleton of our ontology is 
created by protégé; it reflects the most common network services existing. Due to the 
continuously changes in the information technology services, and the needs for organizations 
differ from each other‟s. Ontology should reflect the organization‟s needs to allow better 
prediction and extraction of information, so that it should be updated each time the 
organization needs changed. Manual ontology updating is not a practical procedure, and 
makes the system hard to use, as it requires the user to be a semantic web programmer. In our 
proposed system, we made the ontology creation automated in an easy way [chapter 4], and 
that allows the data to be easily added to it and reflects the structure modified. 
 
 
   93 
 
5.2 Results 
 
Our work is evaluated in three different ways; we apply KDDCup99 dataset to our system, and 
we model our system using queuing model then simulate it using Anylogic simulator. The 
following subsections summarize how our system is evaluated. 
 
5.2.1. Measures using KDD Benchmark 
 
We used and queried data existing in this dataset, to predict new and related attacks from the 
created OKB. We performed different tests on these data to get prediction. The results are 
found as follows: 
 
● The accuracy of prediction depends on several factors that are queried and reasoned 
[chapter 4]. 
 
● As the number of reasoner threshold increased the prediction accuracy increased. 
 
● The best number for the reasoner threshold is four, which shows low false alarm 
predictions. 
 
● The prediction accuracy for the system is 92.8%, if we set the reasoner threshold to 
four. 
 
5.2.2. Queuing Model 
 
We applied this mathematical model to our proposed analytical engine, to predict waiting 
time, and how much time each request is taken to be processed by different modules of the 
system. This is useful model for a multiuser system, and heavy network systems. The 
following results showed after applying queuing model to the system: 
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● Total throughput = 2.9 requests. 
 
● Expected number of requests in the system = 10.8 requests. 
 
● Waiting time for the next request to be served = 11.04 Sec. 
 
● 96% of the time, the system will be busy. 
 
Also we simulated our system using Anylogic software, and showed almost the same results 
[chapter 4]. 
 
5.3 Limitations and Assumptions 
 
All versions of KDDCup99 datasets are combined and used for evaluating our system. These 
datasets share common attacks signatures. In addition, we used NVD vulnerabilities databases 
from 2002 to 2008. It is impossible to test all kind of attacks existing in the world. But we 
think that all attacks can be queried, and informed in the same way as our proposed system 
performs it, since each attack in the world has behaviors and attributes. One limitation in our 
system is that we depend on snort IDS, in capturing attacks, and some research shows that 
snort for heavy networks can drop packets (Bulajoul , James, & Pannu, 2013). Another 
limitation is that snort is a signature based IDS and some attacks; especially web attacks may 
be not recognized and logged. 
5.4 Future Work 
 
Several open issues can be worked on, such as work on enhancing the performance of data 
processing; especially by the categorizer module in the system. In addition, work could be 
undertaken to enhance the predictions performed by the determiner. Also, anomaly based 
intrusion detection systems can be used, to perform detection on masqueraded attacks. 
   95 
 
Furthermore, further research could enable attacks confirmation, by enabling automatic 
penetration test for each attack that has high risk severity. Other work could integrate the 
system with firewalls; for example, if attack that is logged and reasoned with high severity, 
will notify the firewall to automatically create a rule to block the traffic comes from that 
destination. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Snort  
 
Snort is an open source cross platform network intrusion detection system. It works in one of 
the following three modes: the sniffer mode, which is simply, sniffs the network traffic, and 
displays the sniffed traffic on the screen. The second mode is Packet mode, which simply 
sniffs the traffic, and saves them to the hard disk. The final mode is Network Intrusion 
Detection Mode [NIDS], which inspects and logs traffic in the network (Uddin, Khowaja, & 
Abdul Rehman, 2010) (Roesch, Green, Sourcefire Inc, & Cisco, 2015). 
 
Snort uses rules for detection of malware in network traffic. These rules can be applied to 
snort, and customized to detect new attacks signatures. In addition, we can write a rule to pass, 
or drop, or log a certain packets based on their payloads. Rules simply understandable syntax; 
a simple line, and can be extended to multiple lines. In all cases, these rules must be included 
in the snort configuration file called snort.conf file. Snort rules, have two parts: the rule 
header, and rule options. The rule header contains actions that should be taken about a specific 
packet. It is logically divided into Action, Protocol, Address, Port, Direction, Address, and 
port. The rule options, should be true, to invoke an action in rule header part (Roesch, Green, 
Sourcefire Inc, & Cisco, 2015) (Rehman, 2003). 
  
The following example is a simple snort rule, which logs all UDP traffic except for source port 
number 161, which is a SNMP protocol. 
 
log udp any !23 -> any any log udp 
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Appendix 2 
 
 Protégé  
 
Protégé is an open source cross platform written in java programing language. This tool can be 
used to create an Ontology Knowledge Base [OKB]. Furthermore, it can be used to query 
information about stored OKB. Protégé is a GUI tool, which either works through a web 
browser, or through a desktop application.  
 
Web protégé, supports OWL 2.0, allows collaboration with different users. It also, allows a 
customizable user interface, and supports multiple ontologies format, such as XML/RDF, 
Turtle,WL/XML, OBO, and others.  
 
Desktop protégé has the same features as web protégé. In addition, it has support of reasoners. 
Furthermore, it has a built in capabilities that allow the developer to extend the functionality of 
protégé, by updating its core (Stanford, 2015) (Stanford, 2016) (Stanford, 2015) (Horridge, 
2011). The interface of protégé is easy to use, and consists of: menu, tabs, work area, and 
selection area .The following example shows the main interface of ontGraph in protégé 
desktop tool.  
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Figure A.1.1: protégé Ontgraph area. 
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 النظام الذكي المختص بأنظمة مراقبة التسمل الإلكترونية بمناطق خوادم الشبكة 
 
 حسن سعيفانحمد رامي" زهير مإعداد: " 
 
 جيوسيو د. رشيد  اد النجارهج : د.اشراف
 
 :ممخص
 
التنبأ بالهجمات الالكترونية الممكن حصولها عمى الشبكات الإلكترونية هو مهمة صعبة لأنظمة الحماية 
الحالية، حيث أن انظمة المراقبة الحالية تواجة مشكمة في التنبأ بما يمكن الحصول في الشبكة من 
واخطار، وهناك العديد من الابحاث التي يتم اجرائها عمى هذة الانظمة لجعمها اكثر قدرة عمى تهديدات 
 " .gninraeL enihcaMالتنبأ من خلال خوارزميات تعميم الألة "
  
من خلال البحث الحالي تم إستحداث طريقة جديدة لجعل هذة الانظمة تستبط المعمومات وتحميمها من 
". حيث قمنا ygolonhceT citnameSالتسمل الإلكترونية مع التقنيات الدلالية " خلال دمج أنظمة مراقبة
 lanoitaNبربط أنظمة مراقبة التسمل الإلكترونية دلاليا مع قواعد بيانات الإختراق العالمية "
", لجعل هذة الأنظمة دلاليا تستنبط معمومات الأخطار المتوقع حصولها esabataD ytilibarenluV
كة الإلكترونية ومعرفة الأنظمة المعرضة لهذة الأخطار. وقمنا ببناء النظام التحميمي لمنظام من عمى الشب
خلال  تطبيق معايير أمن شبكات الحاسوب الإلكترونية واضافة معايير أخرى مختصة بأنظمة الحاسوب 
بناء عمى متطمبات الموجود فيها خوادم المؤسسات, كما وقمنا بجعل هذا النظام قابل لمتعديل والتحديث 
 المؤسسة. 
 
وفي مرحمة التقييم قمنا بتطبيق النظام بإستخدام أربعة طرق: بناء نظام ويب و قمنا بتجربة هذا النظام 
" لتوضيح  دقة النتائج التي يقوم بها tes atad 99 pu CDDKعمى مجموعة بيانات عالمية تسمى "
النتائج الغير صحيحة الناتجة من التنبأ، كما وقمنا النظام في التنبأ عمى هذة البيانات والتخفيف من 
" لمعرفة قدرة النظام عمى العمل في البيئة ledoM gniueuQبمحاكاة النظام باستخدام تقنية الطوبير "
 ."cigolynAالالكترونية الضخمة, وقمنا بإختبار نظام الطوابير باستخدام اداة محاكاه مختصة تسمى "
